THE 1948 PALESTINIAN REFUGEES - WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY?
By
Dr. Yuval Arnon-Ohana, HaUmma Quarterly Feb 4, 2001
1. Haj Amin Al-Husseini, the Palestinian leader in 1948, drafted a
proposal
during WW2 (1941), requesting that Germany and Italy acknowledge the
Arab
right “to settle the question of the Jewish elements in Palestine,
and other
Arab countries, in accordance with national and racial interests of the
Arabs, and along lines, similar to those used to solve the Jewish
question in
Germany and Italy." Another words, let the Nazis and Arabs kill all the
Jews.
(Fritz Grobba, Peoples and Powers in the East, pp. 194-7, 207-8,
Berlin,
1967; 1988).
2. Jamal Al-Husseini, actin Chmn of the (Palestinian) Arab
Higher
Committee threatened on Nov. 24, 1947 that "Palestine shall be consumed
with
fire and blood," if the Jews get any part of it. The Nov. 29, 1947
partition
Plan was violently rejected by the Palestinians and the Arabs as they
did
with the partition proposals of 1921 and 1937. Then ensuing war,
launched by
Arabs and Palestinians, resulted in 630,000 Palestinian, and 820,000
Jewish,
refugees.
3. Most 1948 Palestinian refugees were from the coastal plane
and
the (Jezrael, Beit She'an and Hula) valleys of Israel, as it was (in
smaller
numbers) during previous periods of inter-Arab economic, social and
military
volatility (40,000 left in 1936-39). Unlike most Galilee Arabs, their
roots
were tenuous, being descendants of Egyptian, Syrian, Lebanese and
Sudanese
migrants, who arrived to the area during 1830-1944 (Please see
Cloakroom #98:
www.acpr.org.il). Many felt more secure in their countries of origin.
Most
Palestinian political and financial leaders left, accelerating the
refugee
phenomenon.
4. Jordanian daily, Filastin (Feb. 19, 1949): "The Arab
States...encouraged the Palestinians to leave their homes, temporarily,
not
interfering with the invading Arab armies." Khaled al-Azam, Syrian
Prime
Minister in 1949 (memoirs, 1973): "We brought destruction upon the
refugees,
by calling on them to leave their homes." London Economist (Oct. 2,
1948):
"The most potent of the factors [in the flight] were announcements made
by
the Palestinian-Arab Higher Committee, urging all Haifa Arabs to quit,
intimating that those remaining would be regarded as renegades." Arab
over-confidence prior to the war (600,000 Jews vs. 27, 000,000 Arabs)
was
crashed by defeat, intensifying the flight of Arabs.
5. Almost 200,000
refugees left BEFORE the large scale war erupted in May 1948, while the
Arabs
had the upper hand! Arabs left Haifa and Jaffa, while British troops
were
still there, pleading with them to stay.
6. The British Mandate ordered
Arabs
and Jews to evacuate towns, where they were a minority. Arabs left
(e.g.
Tiberias), with encouragement of Arab countries, while Jews remained
(e.g.
Safed and its Arabs of Algerian origin). Arab evacuation - and the fall
of
Abd al-Kader al-Husseini in the Castel battle - was highlighted by Arab
media, triggering a Domino Effect of further evacuations.
7. "Arab
leaders
were responsible for the [Arab] flight, disseminating exaggerated
rumors of
Jewish atrocities, in order to incite the Arabs, thus instilling fear
in the
hearts of the Palestinians." (Jordanian daily, al-Urdun, April 9,
1953).
Ismayil Safwat, Commander of Palestinian Operations (March, 1948): "The
Jews
haven't attacked any Arab village, unless attacked first."
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