| When Preemption is the only Option Yaron Schwartz 29 September 2002 Even for an Israeli- living in a country regrettably seasoned in the barbarity of terrorism- 9/11 constituted a cognitive shock. Previously living in the US, I greatly admire its philosophical foundations and ideals as a paragon of democracy and civil liberties and the "other" Promised Land (though I still don't care much for or understand Baseball). Like most people, I only know a reality in which America is a military, political and economic colossus. But the main reason for my distraught was the recognition that the attack constituted a paradigm shift in what we thought we knew about terrorism, and that now the long-held notion that "terrorists want more people watching than dead" was only partly true. Dozens of cruel suicide-bomber attacks notwithstanding, the nightmarish possibility of a single attack killing thousands was something I thought was left for Hollywood's imaginative screenplay writers. Now it was reality. As the prospect of an attack on Iraq looms, the heated debate on the issue of preemptive strike is foremost. The academia is engaged in this healthy public process and plays and important role in that context. So, is there such a thing as a justified preemptive strike? Does it pertain to Iraq? Twenty-one years ago, Israel sent its jets hundreds of miles away for a pinpoint strike in Iraq. In its aftermath, Saddam's reactor at Osirak was destroyed only months before turning operational- his capacity to build nuclear weapons crippled. Israel was safer, as was the world. But much like single-handedly carrying out the attack, it also had to contend with worldwide denunciations hurled at it (especially by the French, who had built the reactor…) Then in 1991's Desert Storm, as US troops liberated Iraqi-occupied Kuwait, Secretary of Defense Cheney expressed a debt of gratitude to Israel for its foresight and bold action a decade earlier. Clearly, the current impasse calls for hard, unequivocal decisions and measures. The world (especially its democratic, responsible members) must recognize the great peril of rogue actors like Saddam Hussein as a producer of WMD on the one hand, with Al-Qaeda and its ilk as the willing users of such weapons, on the other hand. Previous failures to rise to the occasion and heed the warnings cost the lives of tens of millions- Churchill was scorned as a warmonger when he cautioned about Germany's military build-up. Can we afford to do nothing? What more "proof of evidence" do we need or want? "If there is a gun hanging on the wall in the first act, it will fire by the end of the play." Czekhov's words are germane particularly because Saddam's "gun" was already smoking after he uninhibitedly employed chemical weapons against his own people, murdering anywhere between 10,000-50,000 Kurds in Halabje in 1988. UNSCOM's findings vis-א-vis the tyrant's indomitable appetite for attaining nuclear weapons and his hitherto constant violations of UN Security Council resolutions, as listed by President Bush at the UN General Assembly, underpin this argument. Clearly, a UN-backed operation is the optimal course of action- whether by the reinstitution of effective WMD inspections or by militarily measures. Failing that, an ad-hoc US-led alliance would be advisable (e.g. NATO). But should these options prove infeasible (and that may be the case, although there are preliminary signs to the contrary) the US can and must go at it alone with resolve and without having to apologize for it. Since 9/11 plenty has been said about its possible causes and repercussions, albeit the surface has only been scratched: much remains to be learned and applied in the realm of academia, policy-making and international affairs. In the meantime however, a battle is raging- one that unlike previous wars is largely conducted away from the public eye, as intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies try to foil planned attacks. Had we had the chance to do so, would we have refrained from "preempting" Al-Qaeda and save thousands of innocent lives? Bin-Laden, Saddam Hussein and others are not "rethinking" their raison d'ךtre or their goals. For them it is not a question of motives or rationale but of means and opportunity. For the sake of global security, they must be thwarted. Yet against an enemy that cannot be deterred, preemption may be the only course of action. |
The Case Agianst Israel's Enemies by Alan Dershowitz 
Coming from England and particularly from the BBC, MUST BE SEEN VIDEO! ANOTHER MUST SEE VIDEO |